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I. INTRODUCTION.
Keynes' closing remarks in The General Theory are
II . . . the ideas of economists and political
philosophers, both when they are right and when
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little
else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
. . . . I am sure the power of vested interests is
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual
encroachment of ideas. . . . Soon or late it is
ideas, not vested
for good or evil.ttl
interests, which are dangerous
The ideas that Keynes refers to are theories. A theory
of system behavior is a prior for rational action. A
proposed action, whether by individual agents in households





action only as a theory connects the action
result.2
an American folk saying "If it ain't broke
In 1991 the institution of deposit insurance
in the United States is clearly broken: the dedicated funds
of the deposit insurance funds cannot fulfill the obligation
1 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest
and Money, 1936 pp. 383, 384.
2. The essence of the rational expectation revolution in
economic theory can be summed up in the proposition that the
actions economic agents take reflects their understanding,
i.e. theory, of how the economy functions. Peter Albin
phrased this as "The agents in the model have a model of the
modeltl3
to validate the deposits in those insured institutions which
are now unable to meet their obligations. The deposit
insurance obligations have been recognized by the Congress
as full faith and credit obligations of the United States.
Therefor the present Congress needs to either repudiate its
prior commitments or come up with the funds needed to
validate the Congressional promise. 3
Because deposit insurance, the savings and loan
industry, facets of the insurance industry and a number of
great private banks quite apparently have broken down, the
legislative agenda goes beyond merely funding the shortfall
in the deposit insurance funds. As a minimum the Congress
feels it necessary to reform the deposit insurance function
and the associated regulatory and supervisory structure so
that such calls for Treasury financing are not likely to
recur.
As the United states struggles with the problem of
fixing the financial system policy, advocates of any
particular proposal needs to address three questions:
1. "What is it that is taken to be broke?",
2. "What theory about how our economy works underlies the
proposal?"
3. What are the dire consequences of not fixing that which
you assert is broke or alternatively how does the change you
advocate make things better?
3. Congress in late 1991 provided some $70 billions to
validate the liabilities of the banks.4
In what follows I will take up three points
1. Two views of the results of the economic process
2. Systemic and idiosyncratic sources of financial crises
3. Some ideas about the scope for policy in the present
ttcrisislt.
II. TWO VIEWS OF THE RESULTS OF MARKET PROCESSES
There are two fundamentally different views about the
results that a market economy achieves. One, as stated by
Adam Smith, is
"As every individual, therefore, endeavors as
much as he can both to employ his capital in the
support of domestic industry, and so to direct
that industry that its produce may be of the
greatest value; every individual necessarily
labours to render the annual revenues of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed,
neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . and by
directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to
an end which was no part of his intention."
promote
The second, as stated by John Maynard Keynes, is:
"If I may be allowed to appropriate the term
speculation for the activity of forecasting the
psychology of the market and enterprise for the
activity of forecasting the prospective yield of
assets over their whole life, it is by no means
always the case that speculation predominates over
enterprise. As the organization of investment
markets improves, the risk of the predominance of
speculation does, however, increase. . . .
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady
4 A. Smith. 1776, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations, book 4, chapter 2. italics added5
stream of enterprise. But the position is serious
when enterprise becomes a bubble on a whirlpool of
speculation. When the capital development of a
country becomes a by-product of the activit'es of
a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."3
When designing and advocating policies economists and
practical men alike have to choose between the Smithian
theory, that markets alwavs lead to the promotion of the
public welfare, and the Keynesian theory, that market
processes may lead to the capital development of the economy
being ill-done, i.e. to other than the promotion of the
public welfare. If the theory that takes the invisible hand
conjecture as a guide to the way the economy works is valid,
then intervention or regulation can only do mischief. If
the theory that takes the capital development of the country
may be ill done as a guide to the way the economy works is
valid, then regulation and intervention can be beneficial.
Furthermore, if the consequences of doing the capital
development poorly are serious, then it is politically
necessary to create and apply appropriate regulations and
interventions.
The Smithian view leads to the proposition that
financial crises and the deep depressions which followed
arose from particular institutional flaws and not because of
any characteristic essential to a market economy.6 In the
5. Keynes, op tit p. 158-9 italics re casino added
6. Henry Simons, Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary
Policy. JPE, 1935. The essential proposition of the first
Chicago School was that the flaw in the existing capitalist
economy centered around the system of fractional reserve
banking and the separation of money from the financing of6
current crisis the institutional flaws which have been
identified as being culpable are a system of intervention
which allowed some dirty rotten scoundrels to operate,
external shocks which dislodged the economy, and not well
grounded restrictions on banks. In these views the current
crisis reduces to being a result of managements which were
allowed to exploit deposit insurance and geographic, lines
of business and ownership restrictions on banks.'
The Keynesian view leads to the proposition that the
essential processes of capitalist economies result in the
emergence of conditions conducive to financial instability.
Potential instability is a basic from time to time system
characteristic, which follows from the pivotal role of
investment and financing in capitalist economies. 8 Law and
policy makers need to be aware of the institutional
evolution that profit seeking investors and financiers
induce and which can lead to both inflationary surges and
deflationary disruptions. As such instability may well lead
to serious disruptions of investment and profit flows as
well as income and employment, an institutional structure
business would resolve the problem that leads to serious
depressions.
.
7. Modernizins The Financial System, The Department of the
Treasury, United States Government, Government Printing
Office, Washington D.C. February 1991.
8. This is close to the view of J. Schumpeter The Theory of
Economic Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Mass. 19347
which can both contain and sustain profit flows and asset
prices is necessary.
In a particular Keynesian view the 1990-1991 crisis of
the Savings and Loans and the banking system is the result
of a tendency, over protracted periods of good times, for
indebtedness and asset prices to outrun the ability of cash
flows to validate debt contracts and asset prices. The
current problem is not how to bail out the deposit
institutions but how to prevent asset values and profit
flows from falling so far that investment collapses and a
deep and long depression is ushered in. One way to do this
is to prevent the dumping of assets by failing financial
institutions, for such dumping, by lowering asset values,
will play havoc with the mark to market capital of other
institutions and with investment. Another way of doing this
is to assure that the negative net worth on a mark to market
basis of financial institutions in not translated into a
discount on the deposit liabilities of these institutions.'
The funds that Congress makes available for paying off
deposits in institutions with negative net worth are not
just validating deposits but are also preventing the need
for these and other institutions to attempt to make position
by selling out position. It would be a disaster for asset
values if a broad array of intermediaries need to make
position by selling out position.
9. Deposit insurance is a commitment by the government that
the specified liabilities of financial institutions will
always be available at par.8
The sophisticated Keynesian view accepts that while
there is a need to intervene to keep a market economy
performing in a satisfactory manner or to prevent disasters,
actual systems of intervention, especially when they are not
enlightened by a theory which helps us understand why there
is a positive value to intervention, can do substantial
harm. Furthermore the Keynesian view recognizes that agents
learn and adapt, so that a system of intervention that is
apt under one set of circumstances may well become inept as
the economy evolves.
Theoretical economists and practical persons pay lip
service to the invisible hand proposition but, in the modern
world, where Central banks are taken for granted, when push
comes to shove intervention takes place. Actual behavior is
guided by an often implicit theory in which "Markets can do
finance poorlytl is a proposition.
One long standing proposition is that markets manage
money poorly. The monetarist rule that the Central Bank
should see to it that the quantity of money grows at an
appropriate constant rate is a reflection of this view. In
the Smithian view the savings and loan debacle and the
crises in banking and insurance are results of a break down
of regulation, including the regulations that guide the
behavior of the learned professions of law and accounting,"
10. Martin Mayer "The Greatest Ever Bank RobberyI', Charles
Scribners Sons, New York 19909
rather than a consequence of the dynamics of successful
capitalism.
The dominant strain in economic theory since the early
1950's - the mathematical general equilibrium theory
associated with Arrow and Debreau - is used to support the
invisible hand conjecture of Smith as a guide to policy.
This is so even though sophisticated contemporary economic
thinking recognizes that the proofs in modern general
equilibrium theory which validate Smith's conjecture are
rather like a lawyer's brief: they conform to the dictum
that "These are the conclusions from which I draw my
premises". Even so all the proofs under tight conditions
have shown only that a general equilibrium that conforms to
the Smith rule exists: the uniqueness and stability of
equilibrium are not proven. 11
Beyond this it is acknowledged that this theory does
not allow any room for money.12
Keynes "..capital development of a country . . . is
likely to be ill-done.tV proposition implies that markets can
get the investment decisions wrong, as measured by both the
11. B. Ingrao and G Israel, The Invisible Hand, Economic
Equilibrium in the History of Science, 1990. Ingrao and
Israel correctly point out that global stability is a
necessary condition for comparative statics to be valid.
12. "The most serious challenge that the existence of money
poses to the theorist is this: the best developed model of
the economy cannot find room for it." F.H. Hahn, Money and
Inflation, Cambridge Mass. MIT Press 1985, p. 1. One
peculiarity of this essentially cute volume is that banks
and bankers never appear in a volume dedicated to money and
inflation.amount, too little or too
types of investments. As
10
much, or by the distribution among
Keynes remarked
"The measure of success attained by Wall
Street, regarded as an institution of which the
proner social nurnose is to direct new investment
into the most profitable channels in terms of
future yield, cannot be regarded as one of the
outstanding triumphs of laissez faire capitalism
. . . "13
Keynes pointed out that the prices of the existing
stock of assets, both real and financial, as well as the
cash payment constraints imposed by the liability structure
of the holders of capital assets, may lead to an
inappropriate amount or type of investment. If speculation
leads to an excessively high investment ratio and debt
financing of investment and positions in assets, then
excessive demand and inflation are likely to occur.
Furthermore, as is so evident in the portfolio of the
Resolution Trust Corporation, the investments put into place
during an investment boom are often of low value relative to
their costs. As a result liability structures cannot be
serviced by the cash flows these investments can generate as
capital assets and collapse of the price level of assets is
likely to ensue. A sharp break in the price level of assets
leads to institutional failures as well as a collapse in the
aggregate volume of investment. Speculation, the activities
Keynes identified with Wall Street, makes business cycles,
including the sporadic deep depression cycles, rather than
13. J.M. Keynes. The General Theory, p. 15911
equilibrium seeking and sustaining behavior the normal
result of the economic process. 14
In the Keynes view the monetary mechanism is tied to
credit and therefor to the financing of activity. The
interaction between the financial system and what, for want
of a better term, we can call the production system is
introduced at the beginning of the argument, when the
financing of enterprises and investment programs are "on the
table". This is in sharp contrast to the monetarist view
where an asymmetry in the perceptions of different classes
of agents of some assumed exogenous change in the monetary
system, is introduced in order to transform an equilibrium
seeking system into a cycle generating system.15 The
centrality of money, credit and the pricing of capital
assets in the Keynes theory differentiates Keynesian from
Smithian theory.
History shows that every deep and long depression in
the United States has been associated with a financial
crisis, although, especially in recent history, we have had
financial crises that have not led to a deep and long
depression.16 The potential loss to society from a
14. H.P. Minsky, John Maynard Kevnes, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1975 interpreted Keynes as putting forth
an investment theory of business cycles and a financial
theory of investment.
15. Robert E. Lucas Jr. "Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money" reprinted in Robert E. Lucas "Studies in Business
Cycle Theory II MIT Press 1981.
16. The deep depression cycles in M. Friedman and A.
Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960, Princeton, National Bureau of Economic Research, 196312
financial crisis will be great if it leads into a deep and
long depression. If all that follows from a financial
crisis is a redistribution of wealth or a shift of
production from investment to consumption goods within a
full employment economy, then some concerns about equity and
the impact upon the losers in this process may arise. But
this would not lead to the same willingness and necessity to
intervene and take possible efficiency losses as that which
follows once policy is motivated by the possibility that
history, which associates serious depressions with financial
crises, is a good guide to the consequences of a financial
crises in our time. Intervention is ordained if it is
believed that a free market resolution of a financial crisis
requires doing time in a deep depression.
III. SYSTEMIC CONDITIONS
A capitalist economy can be described by a set of
interrelated balance sheets and income statements. The
liabilities of the balance sheet are commitments to make
payments either on demand, when a contingency occurs or at
specified dates. Assets on a balance sheet are either
financial or real and they yield receipts either as the
contract is fulfilled, as some underlying productive process
generates incomes, or as they are sold or pledged. This
balance sheet - income statement way of looking at an
are all associated with episodes of financial instability if
not financial crises. See also M. Friedman and A Schwartz,
"Money and Business Cycles,tt Review of Economics and
Statistics Supplement, February, 1963.13
economy results in a need to focus on how the prices on the
items on the balance sheet and the cash flows that are
generated and committed, all measured in a common
denominator, the money of the economy, are determined.
Capital assets generate cash as compensation for their
participation in the production process, financial assets
generate cash as the maker is able to fulfill commitments.
In addition capital assets, as well as financial assets, can
yield cash by being sold or pledged. For pledging or
selling to be an option either a broker or a dealer market
in assets needs to exist.17
A fundamental property of all capitalist economies is
the existence of a system of borrowing and lending based
upon various margins of safety. The excesses of anticipated
cash flows from asset ownership or participation in income
production over the cash flows committed by the liability
structure are one class of margins of safety. The excesses
of the market or the pledge value of assets over the value
of liabilities which can require the payment of some
principle amount are another class of margins of safety.
A debt instrument or a lease provides for payments to
be made on account of both interest and principal. An
equity liability has only a contingent commitment to make
payments, dividends need to be paid only if earned and
17. See H. P. Minsky Financial Crisis, Financial Systems
and the Performance of the Economy, in Private Capital
Markets, Commission of Money and Credit Research Study,
Prentice Hall, 1964, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey ~~173-38014
declared, and there is no contractual need to repay
principal. For any given cash flow, from operations or from
the fulfillment of owned contracts, the greater the share of
equity financing in a balance sheet the greater the margin
of safety that protects the owners of the non-equity
liabilities.
In addition to the basic household and firm structure
of the economy, there are a variety of firms that both own
and issue financial assets. For such financial
intermediaries the cash flow to is the result of the
fulfillment of terms on contracts, the t'placingt'  of new
liabilities, or the sale or pledging of assets. These
organizations have a variety of liabilities, each type
having its distinctive expected cash flow out. Among these
financial organizations are those which have assets that are
longer in duration than their liabilities: these
organizations always need to refinance their positions.
Such organizations depend upon the normal functioning of
various markets, including dependable fall-back markets in
case the usual refinancing channels break down or become
IltooU1 expensive. The Central bank is the ultimate fall-back
refinancing market.
The normal operation of the economy results in the
assets owned or operated by a firm yielding a cash flow to
the firm. If for some reason an organization needs more
cash than the normal cash flow generated by its assets would
permit, then it needs to be able to force a cash flow in its15
favor either by borrowing or by selling assets. But the
ability of an organization to force a cash flow in its favor
by borrowing or selling assets requires that there be a
market in which lending or buying of such assets takes
place.
The ability of financial organizations
commitments to make payments often requires
refinance or to sell out positions. But





transaction doesn't yield enough to fulfill payment
commitments. This would occur if there are many units in a
situation where refinancing or selling out is necessary: the
refinancing organization may have a limited capacity to
absorb assets. As a result the market price of the assets
can become too low to yield enough funds to meet payment
commitments. Central Bank interventions protect at least
some set of financial institutions from this contingency.
In prior work I have distinguished between hedge,
speculative and Ponzi financial postures. Hedge financing
has the normal cash flow large enough to meet both principal
and interest that are due on debts, speculative financing
has the income of the debtor large enough to meet the
interest but not the principal payments and Ponzi finance
takes place when not enough is earned to meet the interest
due on debts. Speculative finance involves rolling over16
debts and Ponzi finance involves the capitalization of
interest.18
A fundamental conjecture of a model of the economy that
supports the Keynes view is that when hedge financing is the
dominant posture the interest rate structure offers
inducements to increase indebtedness and increase the
proportion of short term financing that requires the rolling
over of outstanding debts. Once there is a large volume of
short term debts outstanding, which finance longer term
positions, and institutions exist where such short term
debts are regularly rolled over, then a rise in interest
rates, a shortfall of earnings or an optimism about future
cash flows can lead to the emergence of Ponzi financing
relations. It should also be pointed out that there is a
respectable type of Ponzi financing, for the normal
financing of long gestation investment projects, even where
hedge financing dominates, involves the folding of interest
on early on costs into the indebtedness on the project.
In all except the financing of long gestation
investment projects Ponzi financing involves the erosion of
the margins of safety. The payment commitments on debts are
increasing as interest is capitalized, even as the ability
to acquire profits is not enhanced by investment. Ponzi
18. H.P. Minsky, "Finance and Profits, the Changing Nature
of Business Cycles", The Business Cycle and Public Policy
1929-1980, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the Uniked
States, United States Government Printing Office, Washington
D.C. 1980. Reprinted in Hyman P. Minsky, Can "It'* Happen
Aqain?", M.E. Sharpe & Co, Armonk N.Y. 1982.17
finance, when it is not construction financing, implies a
decrease in equity, for debts increase without any increase
in assets.
As a result of the erosion of equity and the decrease
in the ratio of cash flow in to payment commitments, Ponzi
finance also leads to a deterioration in a unit's credit
rating so that a unit's interest rates rise relative to the
rates available to the best credits. As a result payment
commitments on debt rise faster than debts. The internal
relations in a Ponzi situation tend to make the conditions
that led to Ponzi financing in the first place worse, not
better.1'
There therefor are systemic conditions that need to be
satisfied for a financial crisis to occur: the financial
structure needs to be heavily indebted, involving a large
element of either Ponzi finance or speculative finance which
can become Ponzi. We can characterize a financial structure
which is predominantly hedge financing as robust and a
financial structure that is heavily speculative and Ponzi as
fragile. The fundamental assertion of the financial
instability hypothesis is that the financial structure
evolves from being robust to being fragile over a period in
which the economy does we11.20
19. Some leveraged buy outs include "payment in kind"
provisions for some of the indebtedness. Payment in kind
financing is Ponzi financing.
20. In a number of papers Mauro Galligatti and Dominic0
Dela Gatti have shown that once the IS-LM structure is
recast in terms of the price of assets and the profit cash18
The systemic element underlying financial crises is the
evolution of the financial structure from being robust to
being fragile, from being mainly characterized by hedge
finance to having the weight of speculative and Ponzi
finance increase. This structural change occurs because the
market sets the prices of capital assets in the context of a
specific institutional structure and a set of judgements as
to the likelihood of alternative contingent environments.
Successful operation of the economy, defined as an interval
in which no serious financial crisis and no serious
depression occur, is taken to imply that the current
institutional structure is less crisis and depression prone
than the structure of earlier times. The view develops that
those environments that are conducive to crises and debt
deflations are not likely to emerge.
The way markets price capital and financial assets
often reflects an heroic assumption that the unknowable can
be known: that propositions about fundamentally uncertain
situations can be derived by assuming that what happens i.e.
the data generated by the economy, can be viewed as if it is
a sample that has been drawn from a well defined probability
distribution. Investment strategies for those who control
assets often are derived by treating uncertain situations as
if they were amenable to the analysis used to understand
flow. configurations in which the economy is stable and
others in which the system is unstable can be identified.
Further, under reasonable assumptions, the system migrates
from financial relations which imply system stability to
others which imply system instability. See19
well defined probability distributions. But once the
randomness associated with uncertainty becomes manifest, the
values sustained by this financial strategy become
inappropriate. The necessity to adjust portfolios in a
world which does not conform to expectations is likely to
lead to the collapse of asset values.20
IV. IDIOSYNCRATIC ELEMENTS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION.
The extent to which indebtedness can rise before a
crisis occurs has changed through time. The fragility of
the system is not solely determined by the payment
commitments on debts relative to cash receipts. Each period
of increased indebtedness has unique elements. The
transformation of a downturn from a recession to a
depression depends not only upon the overall indebtedness of
the economy but also upon the details of the institutional
structure and the pattern and efficacy of interventions
which have the effect of assuring refinancing and sustaining
cash flows.
Innovation, the key to capitalist development, is not
just a product and process phenomena: Financial institutions
and usages are also subject to innovation. New financial
institutions and practices are created, and spread. They
have an impact upon asset and liability structures and
therefor upon the overall stability of the economy. Each
period of rapid financial change and of financial fragility
has unique and often interesting characteristics.21
It is tempting to allow the colorful personalities who
crop up in financial affairs to dominate the story of the
evolution of the financial system and emergence of financial
stresses and crises. One would need more courage than I
possess to try to do for our present situation what J.K.
21. Joseph Schumpeter.Galbraith did for the 1920's and






good job introducing us to today's players, many of whom
seem fit to be added to the rogue's gallery of characters
who trod the boards in the United States' colorful financial
history.23
I want to go beyond the individuals who form the cast
of characters of the current crisis. I want to emphasize a
few historical and institutional features that are a part of
the special causes of the current crisis and which have to
be taken into account if the response to the current crisis
is to be anything but superficial. Each idiosyncratic
element I will discuss is a legacy of past policy decisions.
These policy interventions were guided by a theory: the
question of what theory guided policy is relevant. The
problems we face now may well be the result of a
misspecification by the theories that guided past policies
of the processes that determine what happens in our type of
economy.
Three special characteristics that make the present
situation different from earlier post war episodes of
financial tautness will be examined. These are the crisis
in the structure of banking and finance, the residue from
policies of the 1980's and the maturing of money manager
22. J.K. Galbraith,
23. Martin Mayer,
Sarah Bartlett, The Monev Machine, Warner Books, New
York, 1991.22
capitalism
IV A The crisis in the structure of bankins and finance
The crisis in finance in 1991 is, at least in part, a
delayed response to the experiment in practical monetarism
that took place in 1979-1982.
Monetarist theory holds that inflation is always the
result of too much money chasing too few goods, or some
equally simplistic idea. Monetarism instructs us that to
control inflation the growth of the money supply, which is
defined as currency plus deposits subject to check (Ml) or
as currency plus total quickly available bank deposits (M2),
needs to be controlled. This is achieved by setting the
growth rate of bank reserves and currency, what the
monetarists call HPM, at a rate corresponding to the desired
rate of growth of nominal income. Monetarism instructs the
Federal Reserve to give up any pretense of controlling the
interest rate: whatever the market sets is to be accepted.
The effect of the monetarist prescription for fighting
inflation was to constrain the supply of credit through
those bank channels which result in liabilities that are
counted as part of the money supply. This constraint upon
asset acquisition by banks increased the cost of credit to
borrowers and thus increased the price that purveyors of
alternative sources of credit could charge. Profit
opportunities in supplying credit through non bankinstitutions and
the development
23
through markets improved.24 This induced
of new liabilities by banks and other
financial institutions, as well as of new market based
financing techniques.
Both banks, which have complex portfolios, and savings
and loan associations, with focused portfolios, are in the
business of lending for a longer term than the term of their
liabilities. Banks and Savings and Loans (as well as
insurance companies) have to meet the market in order to
finance their position. When the Federal Reserve constrains
the growth of bank reserves the quick effect is that the
cost of liabilities to banks and Savings and Loans rise
relative to the income their assets earn. As banks and
savings and loans are highly leveraged, a small decline in
the return on total assets translates into a large decline
even unto recognized losses
losses and threats of losses
and thrifts and lead them to
for yield means that they
risk.
in the return on equity. Such
will impair the equity of banks
reach for yield. Such reaching
will accept greater portfolio
Market developments which imply that equity is impaired
and that banks will reach for yield should alert regulators
to tighten their supervision. Bank examination and deposit
insurance were easy to do during the first forty-five or so
years after deposit insurance was institutionalized during
24. H.P. Minsky, Central Banking and Money Market Changes,
OJE 1957 (Reprinted in Can It Happen Asain)24
the Great Depression. In fact deposit insurance was largely
redundant as long as insured institutions generated positive
cash flows after their cost of deposits and operating costs
and the mark to market valuation of their assets was greater
than their deposit liabilities.
The interest rate pattern of the period of practical
monetarism stripped the deposit insurance funds of the
protection provided by the positive cash flows and net worth
of the insured institutions. This increased the exposure of
the insurance funds which called for tighter supervision.
However the Reagan administration was committed to looser
regulation and the regulatory bodies followed the elections.
The growth of the alternatives to bank financing that
now exist and erode the profitability of banking did not
occur because of the working of abstract market forces. A
corollary of the policy that aimed to constrain inflation by
reducing the growth of the money supply is a weakening of
the competitive position of banks. The growth of
alternatives to banks and off balance sheet liabilities of
banks are consequences of the policy of constraining banks.
One standard critique of regulation is that the
regulator is soon captured by the regulated. In the case of
the relation between Central banking and banks did not
happen. The attempt to control inflation by controlling
bank liabilities provided opportunities for non-bank and
market oriented financial institutions and usages to grow
and prosper at the expense of banks.25
IVB The residue from policies of the 1980's
In mid year 1982 two financial shocks occurred well
nigh simultaneously: the collapse of the Mexican Peso and
the crash of the Penn Square bank in Oklahoma City. The
Mexican collapse was not just a collapse of the peso, it
also was a wholesale collapse of Mexican banks, many of whom
had financed part of their position in foreign markets and
from foreign banks and in foreign currencies. The collapse
was the result of private indebtedness of enterprises in the
booming north of Mexico and some portfolio diversification
by Mexicans, who took advantage of the support to the peso
that came from oil revenues and international borrowing.
International pressure and domestic political considerations
forced the Mexican government to nationalize the debts of
the banks: de facto insurance of both domestic and foreign
deposits occurred.
The Penn Square Bank crisis centered around the
origination of loans for the development of oil and gas
properties by one bank and the take out financing of these
loans by other banks. Such a financial usage is necessary
if a system of decentralized local and quasi independent
banks is to be a dominant characteristic of the financial
structure. The Penn Square's placements in a wide variety
of banks that wanted a piece of the action in exploring for
oil and gas collapsed in mid 1982, and helped bring down a26
wide variety of banks over the next several years, including
Continental Bank in Chicago.
The Federal Reserve's response to the twin collapses
was to abandon practical monetarism. Meanwhile the Reagan
administration had entered upon the great experiment of
lowering taxes, not as a response to a recession but as a
means of disciplining government spending, and raising
defense spending: the rationalization for this policy was
that this combination would unleash economic growth. This
radical expansionary fiscal posture was adopted just as the
economy received a sharp downside thrust from the bank





short term Keynesian macroeconomic
offset the recessionary thrust from
deficits make profits available to
business. However instead of stimulating American business,
the deficits sparked a burst of imports of a vast array of
consumer products. A huge international trade deficit
emerged which transferred profits induced by the fiscal
deficit in the United States to those countries that had a
surplus in their trade account with the United States.25 In
25. This view of profits reflects what I now call the KLM
or Dutch airline theory of profits. See Mica1 Kalecki, S
Jay and David Levy, Profits and the Future of American
Societv Harper and Row, New York, 1983 and Hyman P. Minsky.
Stabiliiins an Unstable Economv, Yale UNiversity Press, New
Haven Conn. 198627
the competition among firms for profits American firms lost
to Japanese and other offshore firms in the 1980's.
As a result of the siphoning off to other economies of
profits induced by deficit spending, the government deficits
of the 1980's did not lead to a commensurate rise in
domestic profits and improvement in domestic balance sheets.
It therefor did not trigger a sufficient rise in domestic
investment, domestic profits and the consumption of
domestically produced consumer goods so that income became
sufficiently high so that the deficit was sharply reduced or
eliminated. The uneven prosperity of the 1980's rested upon
a fiscal deficit. The economy never took off, so that high
income and employment levels could be sustained without the
crutch supplied by massive government deficits.
In prior post war recessions the fall in private
investment was first offset by increasing government
deficits, which enable businesses and households to fulfill
their financial commitments and clean up their balance
sheets. After a short interval of dependence of profits on
government deficits, investment and employment in the
private economy increased, which tended to eliminate the
deficit. In the Reagan era, and to date in the Bush
Presidency, the buoyancy of the American Economy has not
been sufficiently great so that the need for deficits was
eliminated.
In our era federal government spending is in excess of
25% of gross national product. Such big government may well28
make it impossible to have a depression of the length and
depth of the 1929-33 experience. This is so because profits
cannot fall to the same extent as in a small government
environment. In the light of the now larger size of the
government it is necessary to redefine a depression: A
depression in a big government capitalist economy is an
extended period in which government deficits maintain profit
flows, even though income and employment do fall to the
extent they did in eras of small government capitalism.
The Reagan era saw a vast increase in the outstanding
government debt as well as a fundamental shift in the
international indebtedness position of the United States.
As a result the United States enters the 1990's with it's
fiscal independence greatly reduced. In this situation
monetary and fiscal interventions to sustain United States
profit flows in a recession, or in the aftermath of a
financial trauma, may not be effective unless the trading
partners adjust their international posture.
IVC The maturins of money manager capitalism
The most important idiosyncratic characteristic of
today's American economy is that the proximate owners of a
very large proportion of the liabilities of business -
especially of the largest businesses - are institutions that
manage money on behalf of an array of claimants. The main
money managing institutions are pension funds, mutual funds,
and trust departments of banks: the annuity business of29
insurance companies is a money managing business. To
understand the impact of the change in which the proximate
owner of the liabilities of corporations are these managed
money organizations we have to look at the interrelations
among balance sheet that show the structure of financing and
of payment commitments of a modern economy.
The capital assets of a modern capitalist economy are
mainly but not exclusively owned by corporations. The
assets on the balance sheet of corporations are long lived
capital assets, inventories and financial instruments and
the liabilities are various types of debts and equities.
The assets organized into operating units are expected to
generate some gross revenues. After deducting current
operating costs the gross revenues becomes the gross capital
income of the operation. The expectation is that the
capital assets as organized into operating units will
generate a time series of gross capital incomes.
The equity and debt liabilities of corporations are
assets in other balance sheets. Equities and debts are
commitments by the emitter of the liabilities to make
payments over time to the holders of the assets. In a
simple and rude representation of a capitalist economy the
liabilities of the capital holding and operating
organizations would be assets of households. The financial
structure is a way of distributing the gross capital incomes
of operating organizations to the households who own the
equities and the debts.Financial intermediation takes
organizations are interposed between
capital assets and the





the firms that operate
that are the ultimate
the economy. As a result of these
a mix of financial instruments are
developed which serve special purposes. In our economy
money, the asset which is always available to meet
obligations and whose value in terms of the ability to
validate debts is never hardly ever in doubt, is just one of
the special purpose financial instruments. Over time a
labyrinth of financing connections has arisen and the
intermediate institutional balance sheets between the
capital assets of the economy and the households that are
the ultimate owners of the private wealth of the economy has
increased. 26
In addition to the liabilities of firms which pledge
and distribute the gross capital income of our economy there
are liabilities of households which are pledges of future
household incomes and liabilities of government units which
are pledges of future tax revenues. 27
In an early and rude stage of capitalism the main
financing that took place outside of the own resources of a
private, non corporate owner were of goods in transit i.e.
26 Raymond Goldsmith summarized the complexity of financial
structures in the financial layering ratios.
27 The structure opens up to international financial
relations: international debts are pledges of future
international trade surpluses.31
commerce was financed through a system of borrowing. This
is why the banks that financed such trade were called
commercial banks.
As the capital intensity of production increased the
need to finance durable assets such as railroads and
utilities as well as capital intensive manufacturing and
retailing led to the emergence of the corporate form of
organizing business and of financiers who arranged for the
placement of debts and equities which gathered the finance
needed for such enterprises. In this structure the
dichotomy between ownership and management was virtually non
existent. Corporations were dominated either by a principal
often founding owner or by a financier who had arranged for
the financing and retained a large interest in the
organization.
The combination of the great depression with its
attendant reorganization of firms and the second world war,
which led to a large increase in household wealth and firms
reducing debts and retaining earnings, meant that ownership
became widely dispersed and corporate reliance on financiers
was greatly diminished. A period in which managers were
largely independent of stockholders control emerged.
Over the post war period of successful capitalism in
the United States the ownership of property has been more
widely distributed than henceforth, but this ownership
increasingly takes the form of positions in various mutual
funds and beneficial interest in pension funds. These funds32
need to be managed. The mangers of these funds presumably
operate in the interest of the owners or the beneficial
interests, but they also have interests of their own.
Thus we can distinguish four stages of interrelations
between finance and firms in capitalist economies. We can
label these as commercial, finance, managerial and money
manger capitalism. Each of these types of capitalist
structures obeyed quite distinct rules of development
through time.
Money manager capitalism has a number of distinct
features. The pension and mutual funds have monies for
placement on a regular basis. They have outgrown the
orthodox high quality stocks and bond portfolios of
fiduciaries. They became a market for specialized
instruments such as securitized mortgages, credit card
receivables and lower quality, i.e. junk, bonds.
They also play a key role in the emergence of leveraged
buy outs. A little known aspect of the leveraged buy out
game is the leveraged buy out funds that each of the main
players in the game controls. The source of the money in
these pools available for equity position in buy outs is
largely though not completely the various managed money
pools. The emergence of money manager capitalism means that
the financing of the capital development of the economy has
taken a back seat to the quest for short run total returns.
V. Policy proposals33
Aside from trivial features and the obvious need to
refinance the bank deposit insurance function the
administrations proposals are virtually dead on arrival at
the Congress.
The Administrations recommendations address the
emerging crisis in the banking system as well as the Federal
financing of the validation of the deposit liabilities of
Savings and Loan associations as problems that are due to
specific institutional weakness in the banking system rather
than any fundamental or deep seated flaw in market
economies. In terms of the distinction between Smithian and
Keynesian perspectives on the way the economy functions, the
Administration's proposals are Smithian for they impute the
problems to a minor flaw in the institutional structure
rather than to basic characteristics of the economy.
The proposed reforms include the rather trivial matter
of how the supervision of banks is to be divided between the
Federal Reserve, the Treasury and a Deposit Insurer. Being
a Treasury document the recommendations quite predictably
are that the power of the Treasury should be augmented and
that the Federal Reserve should specialize in something
called monetary policy. The hypothesis is that monetary
policy can be separated from any concern about the assets
acquired by banks and other financial institutions. The
recommendation about governance reflects a belief that
banking and finance have nothing to do with the capital
development of the economy. They do not address the34
question of whether the financial system that will emerge
after their reforms are in place will lead to our doing the
capital development of our economy well.
Within the framework of the Keynesian view the main
policy objective is to put a financial structure in place
which is conducive to doing the capital development well.
This is the criterion by which all policy proposals are to
be judged.
A quick and dirty list of some policies that may well
be needed if we are to emerge from the present crisis with a
financial structure that will do the capital development of
the economy well include:
1. Development of protection for early outstanding
bonds when a major refinancing takes place. The junk bond
phenomena was in part a transfer of value from existing
debts to the new debts or the initial equity owners. The
development of a right to put bonds whenever a serious
change in the financial structure of the debtor takes place
in a refinancing may be necessary. The doctrine of
conveyance has to made to conform to current practices so
that the use of managed funds for private gain is
discouraged.
2. Need to question the pension fund system. Should
policy induce a shift to defined contribution schemes?
Should the power of pension funds be attenuated by having
open ended IRA's? (No limit to contributions, withdrawals
without penalty but all withdrawals taxed, interest and35
dividend accruals not taxed except as they are spent.)
Opening up the IRA's may well require a thorough overhaul of
the income tax. Perhaps the income tax should be
transformed into a spending tax.
Because it is desirable that there not be too many
impoverished older people allowing for individuals to manage
their own pension funds may well require that the Social
Security System be opened so that the larger incomes will
contribute and larger benefits will be available.
3. The government is no different than any other
organization in that it needs revenues to validate its
debts. This means that the government should have a normal
conditions balanced budget, allowing for deficits in
recessions and depressions and major wars. Inasmuch as a
government that spends some 16% to 20% of GNP is more
conducive to the normal functioning of a market economy than
a government that spends some 3% to 9% of GNP, the tax
system must be such that it yields 16 to 20 % of GNP when a
close approximation to full employment is achieved.
4. Furthermore the government budget should be
designed to have an automatic macroeconomic anti
inflationary effect. Indexing as a mechanical device in
social security and government pensions should be abolished,
so that inflation leads to a substantial budget surplus.
5. Government spending should increasingly be
directed towards the creation of resources and the creation
of opportunities that enterprise can exploit. Better36
coordination between the macroeconomic impact of government
spending, the promotion of conditions that sustain profit
flows. and the microeconomic impact of government spending,
the creation of conditions conducive to private resource
creation and progressive enterprise is needed.
6. In the presumed imminent refunding of banks and
Savings and Loan Associations the government has been
recapitalizing failed banks and S&Ls without taking an
equity position in the banks. The Hoover Roosevelt Jesse
Jones Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a devise for
equity infusions into organizations that were in principle
viable but had been caught by non performing assets which
were not performing because the aggregate economy was
performing poorly rather than because the underlying project
had been ill conceived.
7. One weakness of the banking system centers around
the American scheme of paying for the payments system by the
differential between the return on assets and the interest
paid on deposits. In general the administration of the
checking system costs some 3.5% of the amount of deposits
subject to check. If the checking system were an
independent profit center for banks then the banks would be
in a better position to compete with the money funds.
8. Narrow banks, 100% money and other devices for
loosing sight of the main object: The capital development of
the economy. The key role of banking is lending or better
financing. The questions to be asked of any financial37
system are what do the assets of banks and other financial
institutions represent, is the capital development of the
economy better served if the proximate financiers are
decentralized local institutions, and should the stricture
lean towards compartmentalized or broad jurisdiction
institutions. In the United States this becomes the issue
of the future of Glass Steagall.
When we go to the theater we enter into a conspiracy
with the players to suspend disbelief. The financial
developments of the 1980's can be viewed as theater:
promoters, promoters and portfolio managers suspended
disbelief with respect to where the cash would come from
that would the projects being financed. Bankers, the
designated sceptic in the financial structure placed their
critical faculties on hold. As a result the capital
development was not done well. Decentralization of finance
may well be the way to reintroduce the necessary scepticism.
But more important than the details of where the
economy is broke and needs fixing is the proposition that
any program of reform reflects a model of the economy held
by the champions of the program. It is my contention that
the Smithian model of the economy fundamentally misspecifies
the processes and the determinants of the performance of the
economy and therefor any program of reform based upon its
precept will enjoy but accidental and transitory success.